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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

srr~ATE

OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case
No. 9546

DAVID FARNSWORTH,
Defendant and Appella;nt.

BRIEF OF. RESP·ONDENT

NATURE OF CASE
Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second
degree, 76-9-3, U.C.A.1953, in the Second Judicial District
Court on June 16, 1961, and contends that an incompetent
defense and other legal errors require reversal.

DISPOSITION MADE BY LOWER COURT
Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second
degree on June 16, 1961, at a trial before th.e Honorable
1
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Charles G. Cowley, sitting without a jury. After conviction, the defendant was referred to the Adult Probation
and Parole Department for a pre-sentence report. On
July 3, 1961, defendant was present in court with counsel
who argued the imposition of the sentence, and the court
continued the sentence date until July 10, 1961. On July
10, 1961, defendant was sentenced to the State Penitentiary for an indeterminate period of one to twenty years.
At the time of imposition of sentence, the defendant's
counsel was not present. On July 31, 1961, the defendant's
motion for a new trial was denied. The defendant
.
filed a notice of appeal and is free on bond, pending the
outcome.
.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance of the Trial Court's judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 12th of December, 1960, a complaint was issued against defendant for the crime of burglary in the
second degree. (R. 1) On the 15th of December; 1960, the
defendant and counsel appeared in open court and waived
preliminary hearing. (R. 3) Thereafter, au information
was filed (R.. 5) and defendant entered a plea of not
guilty on the 3rd of January, 1961. On June 16, 1961, the
defendant 'vas tried 'vithout a jury and convicted of the
charge.
The facts and circumstances of the trial are material to the defendant's claim of incompetent r_epresenta2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion. A jury trial was waived by the defendant (R. 1),
\Vho \vas represented by counsel. Counsel was apparently
hired by the defendant, as no indication of appointment
appears of record.
Six witnesses were called by the State. The first
"~itness, Donna Young, testified that she had closed
Young's Market in Roy, Utah, on the evening of the 6th
of December, 1960, and then opened it on the morning
of the 7th of December at about 10 :00 a.m. (R. 3, 4). She
indicated the padlock on the door had been ripped off, and
certain items were missing from the store. She identified
certain property in the courtroom as being items from
her store. (R. 5) She was cross-examined by the defense
counsel concerning whether there was any indication of
a breaking. (R. 7, 8)
The second witness, Gene King, testified as an accomplice and admitted the commission of the burglary with
the defendant. (R. 8-11) With reference to the time of the
crime, the record discloses ( R. 9) :
'' Q. Did you shortly after midnight, which would

be early morning of December 7th, have occasion
to be in Roy, Utah 1
"A. Yes."
Thereafter, he testified tha.t at that time he and the accused burglarized Young's Market. He testified that after
the burglary (R. 12):
''We transferred the stuff from the back seat to
the trunk of the car. Then we stayed in the car
and slept until that morning."
3
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During the course of the direct examination of King, defense counsel objected to the admission of evidence. (R.
14) There was no cross-examination.
Thereafter, a Roy City Patrolman testified as to the
apprehension of the defendant during a routine check,
and the seizure of items taken from the store. (R. 14-17)
During the course of examination, several objections were
raised by defense counsel, and sustained by the court.
(R. 17)
Thereafter, two peace officers testified as to the physical evidence at the site of the burglary, and the chain
of custody of items found at the scene (R. 18-19), and
as to the chain of custody of items taken from the presence of defendant. (R. 20-21) A deputy sheriff further
testified as to chain of custody of the sized items, a~d as
to a criminalistic examination of a screwdriver taken
from the presence of the defendant and King. (R. 24)
The State rested.
The defense chose not to put on evidence, and no
arguments were made. (R. 25) The court adjudged defendant guilty.
The sentencing was continued, and later a ne"· counsel argued the appropriate sentence to the court, and
the matter was continued. (R. 1A-4A) Thereafter, the defendant was sentenced to confinement in the Penitentiary
in the absence of counsel. (R. 4A) A motion for a new
trial thereafter made was denied. ( R. 19)
4
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Based upon the above facts, the defendant claims
three errors exist which require reversal. The State submits none of the claimed errors require reversal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I.
THE DEFENSE OF THE DEFENDANT AT
TRIAL WAS NOT SO INCOMPETENT AS TO
CONSTITUTE A SHAM OR MOCKERY OF
.JUSTICE AND THUS TO REQUIRE REVERSAL.
PoiNT II.
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS A FINDING
THAT THE BURGLARY CHARGED WAS
COMMITTED IN THE NIGHTTIME.
PoiNT III.
THE ABSENCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL AT
THE TIME OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE
DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT I.
THE DEFENSE OF THE DEFENDANT AT
TRIAL WAS NOT SO INCOMPETENT AS TO
CONSTITUTE A SHAM OR MOCKERY OF
JUSTICE AND THUS TO REQUIRE REVERSAL.
The defendant contends that he was inadequately
represented at. trial, and, as a result, he is entitled to a
5
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new trial. The appellant bases his contention upon the
provisions of Amendments Five, Six and Fourteen of
the Federal Constitution, and upon Article I, Sections 7
and 12 of the Utah Constitution, being the right to counsel and due process provisions. To the degree that the
defendant may rely upon the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, his. reliance is misplaced, since the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution are not applicable to the states.
Betts v. Bra.dy, 316 U. S. 455 (1942). The constitutional
construction is succinctly noted in 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 316, where, referring to the Fifth Amendment, it is said:
''The foreg<>ing provisions of the Federal Bill of
Rights, however, apply only to the United States.
In no manner are these provisions limitations on
the States. q
And, in reference to the Sixth Amendment, it is noted
in the same section, 1961 Supplement :
''However, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such,
the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment * * *.''
In Po1DPll v . .Alabattna., 287 U. S. 45, the Supreme Court
held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment may incorporate certain rights to counsel,
and held that in all capital cases the right to counsel 'vas
essential to due process. Subsequently, in Betts v. Brady,
supra, the court was confronted w,.ith a contention that
due.- process requires counsel in all non-capital cases.
6
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rrhe court rejected the cont(lntion and stated the rule in
terms of PHsential fairness. It said:

''As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one
'vhose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want
of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we
cannot say that the amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or
in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice
accorded a defendant who is not represented by
counsel.''
Thus, any claim of Federal Constitutional violation must
be a matter of due process. As to the specific issue of
whether due process of law can be said to encompass the
question of competency of counsel, it was noted in Penn
v. Smith, 188 Va. 367, 49 S.E. 2d 600 (1948), that there
had been no express holding by the United States Supreme Court on the issue.' The situation apparently is
still the same today, since it is noted in 74 ALR 2d, p.
1397, that:
'' • • • there seemingly has been up to this time
no direct pronouncement by the United States
Supreme Court concerning the subject under discussion [incompetency of counsel] * • •. ''
It is to be noted that in Powell v. Alabama, supra, as
well as Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945), and Reece v.
t

Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts ( 1955), p. 189, notes:
"Perhaps the only area where the lower courts have been under siege
on a matter .not clarified by the Supreme Court is that of competency
of counsel and effective appointment of counsel."

7
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Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 ( 1955), among other cases, the Supreme Court stated that effective assistance of counsel in a state prosecution for a capital crime is a requirement of due process, and in Betts v. Brady, supra, it noted
that in certain non-capital cases it may be necessary to
essential fairness; however, the standard of what is required has never been passed on by the U. S. Supreme
Court.
The lower federal courts have passed on the matter.
However, they have generally said that "lack of preparation or interest, incompetency or inadequacy'' are ordinarily not sufficient circumstances to set aside a conviction. Ex Parte Haum.esch, 82 F. 2d 588 (9th Cir. 1936);

Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F. 2d 962 (lOth Cir. 1941);
Johnnene v. Graham, 138 F. Supp. 542 (D. C. Utah 1956);
Barker v. United States, 227 F. 2d 431 (lOth Cir. 1955).
The state courts, passing on the same contention,
have also held that their constitutional provisions similar to Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, were to be construed in the same fashion. Ex Parte

Ga1nmon, 255 Ala. 502, 52 So. 2d 369 (1951); Daries v.
Peoplr, 10 Ill. 2d 11, 139 N.E. 2d 216 (1956); People v.
Grg·urerich, 153 Cal. App. 2d 806, 315 P. 2d 391 (1957).
For these reasons, it is submitted that whether the issue
is framed under the State or Federal Constitutional provisions, the same standard is applicable. The general rule
applicable in cases 'vhere post-conviction or appellate
8
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claims of ineffective counsel are made is summarized in
74 AljR 2d 1403 in the following terms:
'' • "" "" most courts considering • * * the question
of incompetency of retained counsel are generally
agreed that the Judgment of conviction is void
'vhen counsel's representation has been so inadequate as to make the trial a farce and a mockery
of justice, thereby denying the accused a fair trial
(due process of law) * "" *."
The Nevada Supreme Court stated it as follows in
~'Jtate v. Ju,kech, 49 Nev. 217, 242 Pac. 590 (1926):
"We think that the rule deducible from the cases
is that a new trial should not be granted by an
appellate court in a criminal case on account of
the incompetency or neglect of counsel, unless it
is so great that the defendant is prejudiced and
thereby deprived of a fair trial."
Thus the trial must be of such a low character as to render the trial a "farce and a mockery." People v. Durpee,
156 Cal. App. 2d 60, 319 P. 2d 39.
It is submitted that the defense in this instance, although some may say it could have been done better, was
not a ''mockery of justice'' so as to warrant reversal.
Defendant protests that certain aspects of the case
require a judgment of reversal. An examination of these
contentions discloses that they are without merit. First,
it is inferentially contended that the waiving of a jury
trial was such a circumstance as would support a claim
of misconduct. It can hardly be claimed that a trial before a judge makes the trial a mockery, nor can such an
9
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inference be drawn, based on other facts of record. Trial
strategy or tactics may be best served in laying the matter before a judge alone. In Lucas v. State, 227 Ind. 486,
86 N.E. 2d 682 (1949), the defendant appeared at trial
and apparently acquiesced in the waiver of a jury trial,
as defendant did here. Thereafter the contention was
made that defendant desired a jury and some evidence
supported this contention; however, the Indiana Court
denied any claim to relief based on a claim of incompetency.
The absence of an opening statement in no way reduces the trial to a mockery. The purpose of the opening
statement is to inform the jury or the court of the evidence to be presented so as to make the evidence easier
to follow. However, where the case is not complex, and
issues are being tried to the judge, the need to present
an opening statement is not present. It should be noted
that the prosecution also waived the opening statement,
and such a practice is common in a non-jury trial for both
sides. Indeed, authorities differ as to the value of an
opening statement, Rothblatt, Successful Techniques in
the Trial of Criminal Cases, 1961, p. 38, a.nd its absence
here will not add to a rlaim of jurisprudential mockery.
Defendant's contentions that defense counsel should
hay·e compelled the State to prove facts or elements making up the crime are some,vhat ludicrous. The duty is on
the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt. The duty rests upon the prosecution
to prove each <.)lement of the crime, and a defense counsel

10
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who disclosed weaknesses to the prosecution or proved
omitted elements might himself be suspect in his loyalty.
Indeed, the defense counsel's actions in holding the proserution to their own proof might have been his best trial
tactic, since should the prosecution neglect to prove an
essential element, the trial judge could only acquit. Where
the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, this course may be
the only defense open.
Equally as unmeritorious is any claim that the defense counsel was remiss in not impeaching a state witness. Defendant appears to be referring to the accomplice, Gene King; however, King testified to committing
the crime with the defendant (R. 10), and hence, by his
own admission, bad committed a felony. Certainly, it is
not incumbent upon defense counsel to point out to the
court what is obvious for all to see, upon penalty of an
accusation against his competency.
The defendant's contention that defense counsel
failed to object to inadmissible evidence, apparently the
result of an illegal search and seizure, is equally questionable in demonstrating incompetency. The trial of defendant was on June 16, 1961. At the time of trial the
Utah law was not to exclude evidence illegally obtained.
State v. Fair, 10 U. 2d 365, 353 P. 2d 615 (1960). The
U. S. Supreme Court did not hand down its revolutionary
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 343 (1961), compelling
such exclusion, until June 19, 1961, or three days after
the defendant's trial. Even had an objection been made,
and overruled, it is doubtful if the defendant's position
11
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would be any better on appeal, since the present trend of
authority is not to apply the Mapp rule retroactively.
People v. Figueroa, 30 LW 2158 (N.Y.); People v. Bertrand, 30 LW 2028 (N.Y.). It would appear that defendant would have counsel do things of dubious value in
order to demonstrate his competency.
The only real issue raised by defendant attacking his
counsel's performance is whether his failure to cross-examine all the State's "~itnesses, and to present evidence
on behalf of the defendant was of such a nature as to
reduce the trial to a ''mockery of justice.'' Apparently
defendant would have counsel examine every witness
whether the examination would or would not contribute
to the defendant's position. However, Roth blatt, supra,
p. 47, points out:

''Only cross-examine when you can aid defenda;n.t 's case or weaken prosecution's case.''
See also Wellman, The Art of Cross-Exanzination, p. 8.
Had counsel cross-examined the accomplice or police
officers, it is doubtful that it "rould haYe in any " . . ay aided
the defendant, and certainly could haYe seriously harmed
him. Thus, it could have resulted in an assertion by King
that defendant had suggested or initiated the idea of
the burglary, or that he had made damaging admissions
or got smart "·ith the police. It appears clear as to what
the defense counsel here intended to do. With the eYidence
of guilt over"·helming, and \Yith a previous bad record to
overcome (R. 1J\-4A), his obYious strategy " . . as one " . . ell
known to experienced criminal la\Yyers - to place the
1~
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erimP bPfore thP court in the simplest, most unaggravated
terms in an effort to mitigate a sentence. With only a
prima facie case before i he eourt, shO\\,.ing a burglary
where food and beverage items were taken, coupled with
the defendant's age, the trial court would be more likely,
in vie"'" of a bad past record, to accord the accused another
ehance than had defense counsel thrashed the witness
without chance of changing the result, elicited hostile
testimony, and had defendant perjuriously denied his
guilt in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Had defendant taken the stand, his past criminal conduct may well have been placed before the court,
without the diluting accompaniment of a probation report. Had additional character testimony been presented,
it would have opened the door for rebuttal.

In Darcy v. Cla.udy, 367 Pa. 130, 79 A. 2d 785 (1951),
the court was faced with an argument that counsel was
incompetent because he did not put defendant on the
stand or produce reputation testimony. In rejecting the
argument, the court said:
''Whether he should have had the relator take the
witness stand and have produced reputation testimony was obviously, as every trial lawyer knows,
a matter of judgment to be decided in the light of
the circumstances as measured by various considerations of poliey.''
In the instant case the trial strategy obviously called for
limiting the evidence to its simplest form. Defense counsel made objections in areas where it was possible that
damaging testimony could have been elicited. (R. 17, 18)
13
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In addition, he cross-examined the essential witness on
the issue of the breaking. Under these circumstances, the
defendant cannot complain because he now feels a different tack would have been more successful. 24 ALR 1022,
64 ALR 437.
It should be noted that the evidence of record indicating the guilt of the accused is extremely strong. In
Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (1955), the
court noted the importance of evidence of guilt where
the allegation was of an incompetent defense counsel.
It said:
''We also recognize that in a habeas corpus proceeding this court • • • [is] not concerned as to the
guilt or innocence of the petitioner of the crime for
which he was convicted. However, when the question of incompetency of counsel is called into question by the petitioner, the question of guilt must
be considered by us for the reason that if defendant was conclusively guilty the question as to just
what his counsel could do by way of defense is
important.''
Other cases and authorities have so noted. Wilson v.
State, 273 Wis. 522, 78 N.W. 2d 917 (1956); MiUer v.
Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 192 P. 2d 147 (1948); 74 ALR
2d 1414.
Where the evidence, as here, is compelling as to the
accused's guilt, counsel has little alternative as to ho""
to conduct the defense. Here counsel apparently determined that the best way to proceed was to diminish the
criminality by limiting the evidence presented on both
14
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sides to a prima facie case. A defendant has a right to
plead not guilty and to charge the State to its burden of
proof. If the State meets the burden by overwhelming
l\vidence, the defendant has no case to present, can he
claim his trial \vas a sham because none \vas manufartured ·1 It is submitted he cannot.
1\lere irregularities, or differences of opinion as to
strategy will not suffice to make a trial a sham, Soulia, v.
O'Brie11, 94 F. Supp. 764, nor incompetency or neglect

alone. 74 ALR 2d 1399.
In the instant case defense counsel was an experienced and reputable attorney of many years, well schooled
in the defense of criminal matters. His strategy was
obviously directed towards placing the State to its burden, limiting the proof to the barest essentials in an
effort to mitigate criminality, with the hope of sustaining
a second chance. In such an instance, as was noted in
People v. Martin, 210 l\Iich. 139, 177 N.W. 193 (1920):

''An appellate court cannot determine whether the
course pursued by an attorney defending a man
charged with crime * * * was the best means of
promoting his defense.''
It is submitted the defendant's contention is without merit, and that the facts fully support a conclusion
that defendant's trial was not of such a low level as t<;>
constitute a mockery of justice, and, hence, there was no
denial of due process warranting reversal.

15
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PoiNT

II.

THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS A FINDING
THAT THE BURGLARY CHARGED WAS
COMMITrrED IN THE NIGHTTIME.
The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that the burglary in question was committed in the nighttime. The evidence of record shows
that Young's Market in Roy, Utah, was closed on the evening of December 6, 1960, and opened at about 10 :00 a.m.
the morning of the 7th of December, 1960, at which time
it appeared that the store had been burglarized. If this
were all the evidence of record concerning the time of
the burglary, there would be no more evidence than that
presented in State v. Miller, 24 Utah 312, 67 Pac. 790
(1902) upon which the defendant relies, and wherein the
Court noted :
''Nor are there any circumstances in evidence of
such a character as to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the prisoner took the goods in the nighttime.''
In the instant case, however, additional evidence of record does appear to show that the burglary in question was
committed in the nighttime. The record reflects the following: (R. 9)

'' Q. Did you shortly after midnight, which would
be the early morning of Deeember 7th, have occasion to be in Roy, Utah?
' 'A. Yes, we were.

''Q. And was David with you at that time!
''A. Yes.
16
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~ 'Q.

And how did you get out to Roy at that time?
''A. We were in his car.

''Q. Where did you go when you went to Roy at
that time?
''A. Well, we went to a little store in Roy there in
the southwest end of Roy.
"Q. Can you describe the store that you went to-,
~Ir. King?
''A. Well, it was a brick in the front and a. cinder
block on the sides. It had a door on the south front door on the south - a side door on the west
side. It had windows around the sides.
"Q. As you approached the store, "~hat was done
\Yi th the car?
"A. We had parked it about fifty, sixty feet back
from the store on the east side of the store.
'' Q. Did you then go to the store T
"A. Yes."

The record further reflects that the accomplice King
testified : ( R. 12)

"Q. What did you do?
''A. We transferred the stuff from the back seat
to the trunk of the car. Then "\Ve stayed in the
car and slept until that morning.''
Thus there is direct evidence, therefore, that the burglary was committed around midnight, and additional inferenti~l testimony to indicate that it was not yet morning. This supplies the evidence found lacking in the
Miller case. In State v. Richards, 29 Utah 310, 81 Pac.
142 (199~), ~he court was also ~aced with a claim that
the evidence did not support a finding that the burglary

17
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in question was committed in the nighttime. The court
noted that other circumstantial evidence would support
a finding that the burglary was committed during the
nighttime. The evidence disclosed that the owner had
full view of the burglarized premises from sunrise until
opening of the store and detected nothing. The court held
the Miller case to be inapplicable because circumstantial
evidence of the burglary being committed in the nighttime was of record.
Here, the evidence, without contradiction, shows that
the breaking and entering occurred shortly after midnight in the early morning, and that after the burglary,
defendant stayed in his car until the next morning. The
evidence amply sustains the conclusion that the burglary
was committed in the nighttime. The evidence is similar
to that in People v. Mendoza, 17 Cal. App. 157, 118 Pac.
964 ( 1911), where the court said:
''The evidence, however, without contradiction,
shows that the entry to the building was made 'in
the evening some time after dark. This was clearly sufficient to justify the conclusion of the jury
that the offense was committed after sunset.''
Certainly, here, the evidence would clearly justify the
trial court's conclusion that the crime was committed in
the nighttime. The facts in the instant case are no less
supporting than those in State v-. Manger, 7 U. 2d 1, 315
P. 2d 976 (1957), where the eourt noted:
"Appellant's contention that there was no evidence from which the jury could have determined
the entry into the Trading Post was made during
18
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the nighttime is also \vithout merit. ..:-\.lthough
there is no direct testimony of anyone discovering
thl} Pllt ry l>t> fore daybreak, nevertheless the e·vidence disclosed that appellant \vas at a party until
1:30 or 2:00 a.m. of July 13, and that at about
3 o'clock someone was heard to enter the house
in "·hich appellant lived and shortly thereafter
"·as seen to stand on his bed and reach up to the
ceiling for something. From all these circumstances the jury could reasonably find beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant had entered the
store sometime between 2 and 3 a.m. of July 13
\vith the intent to commit larceny.''
Here there is direct evidence fixing the commission of the
burglary at a time shortly after midnight, which amply
sustains findings that the burglary was committed in the
nighttime.

PoiNT III.
THE ABSENCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL· AT
THE TIME OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE
DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL.
The defendant contends it was error to impose sentence upon him in the absence of his counsel. The record
reflects that on June 16, 1961, the defendant was adjudged
guilty. The sentencing was continued until June 26, 1961,
and a pre-sentence report requested. (R. 26, 27). On
the 26th of June, the matter was continued until the 3rd
of July at the request of new counsel. (R. 12) On the
3rd of July, 1961, the accused and his counsel appeared
before the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, and counsel
was afforded the opportunity of presenting his views on

19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the sentence to. be imposed, and arguing the merits of
probation. (R. 1A-4A)
The matter was continued until July 10, 1961, at
between 2 :00 and 3 :00 P.M. ; however, on July 10, 1961,
at 10 :00 A.M., the court, having apparently forgotten the
time setting, sentenced defendant to confinement. Subsequently, on July 31, 1961, the defendant made a motion
for a new trial, which was denied. (R. 19) Based upon
the above facts, the defendant contends error was committed, and that he was denied his constitutional rights
under the State and Federal Constitutions.
It should be noted at the outset that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not fully incorporate the right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings, but rather, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that counsel,
in a non-capital case, need only be afforded where the
absence of counsel would cause the defendant's trial to
be said to lack fundamental fairness. Betts v. Brady, 316
U. S. 455 (1942). It does not appear that the Supreme
Court has yet said that the absence of counsel at the
sentencing of an accused in a non-capital case is per se
a violation of due process of la\v in the absence of
circumstances clearly demonstrating a ''fundamental
lack of fairness.' ' 2 Thus, defendant's claim of a federal
violation is only valid if the facts demonstrate suc.h a
2

Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 ( 1948) is a case where the Supreme
Court found such a fundamental unfairness where the court considered
matters as true in affixing the sentence which were in fact false and
acted in an extremely unjudicious manner.
'
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fundamental unfairness. Not e\·Pn the federal court~
have been able to reach an unanimity on \\·hether the ahsenee of rounsel at the imposition of sentence in a federal
ease rPquirPs rPversal.
In Kent v. Sanford, 121 F. 2d 216 (1941), the court
held no prejudice resulted. Compare Batson v. United
States, 137 F. 2d 288 (1943); Taylor v. Hudspeth, 113 F.
2d 825 (1940); Losrorn v. Johnsson., 118 F. 2d 704 (1941);
Janney v. United Sta.tes, 227 F. 2d 105 (1955 ), with Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F. 2d 834 (1946) and Martin v. United
States, 182 F. 2d 225 (1950). It must be concluded that
the mere absence of counsel at the time of sentencing is
not a factor evidencing such fundamental unfairness as
to warrant reversal, because of a denial of federal due
process. The cases cited by defendant from the federal
courts did not themselves result in reversal.
In Sheeha;n v. Delmore, 225 F. 2d 271 (1955 ), the
Ninth Circuit held that the absence of counsel in a state
proceeding where defendant was being resentenced was
not a denial of due process.
The only real issue to be resolved is whether the
provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 7
and 12, require the presence of counsel at every stage of
the proceeding, irrespective of the prejudice that may
result.
The state court decisions are apparently in conflict
as to ,vhether ·or not the absence of counsel during the
trial is such an error, constitutional or otherwise, as to
21
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require reversal. The conflict is noted in Beaney, The
Right to Counsel in American Courts, (1955), p. 123,
where it is said:
'' * • • there is a division of judicial opinion as to
the effect of the absence of counsel at any of the
various stages of trial.''

As to the effect of counsel's absence at the sentencing
portion of the trial, it is generally deplored, but it is
usually held that in the absence of a showing of prejudice, the defendant cannot object. In 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1574, it is said:
''While the practice of sentencing accused in the
absence of his counsel has been condemned, it has
been held that where the statute does not so require, and where the sentence is not considered
part of the trial, it is not necessary that counsel
for accused be present when sentence is pronounced, and that the fact that such counsel was
not present when sentence was pronounced, notice
of the time having been given to him, in the absence of a showing that accused was prejudiced
thereby, is not ground for objection.''
Although some cases have indicated an absolute constitutional right to have counsel present at the time of
sentencing, others have not. JfcCall v. State, 79 So. 2d 51
(Ala. 1955). In addition, most courts have examined
the circumstances surrounding the imposition of sentence to ascertain if prejudice resulted before declaring
a violation of constitutional rights. Typical of the cases,
and one similar in circumstance to that now before the
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1

<>urt, is fJeople v. J)i.sczek, 404 Ill. 465, 89 N.E. 2d 387
( 1950), "~here the Illinois Court said :

(

"The only other contention to be considered is that
the trial judge failed to advise Pisczek .of his right
to have counsel at all times throughout the trial.
\Vhen the court 'vas disposing of the application
for release on probation, it appeared that the attorney who had represented Pisczek throughout
the trial had withdrawn from the case because he
had not been paid for legal services previously
rendered. The reord does not show Pisczek was
advised of his right to new counsel or that he requested a new attorney. Defendant concedes that
the mere fact the court did not inform him of his
right to counsel is not in and of itself a grounrl
for reversal. His point is that failure to advise
him of the right to counsel, coupled with other surrounding circumstances attending the fairness of
the trial does, however, constitute reversible error.
In the present case, defendant was tried by the
court without a jury and he was competently represented by counsel upon the trial of the ca.us~
to and including the making of the motion £or probation. When the application came on for hearing
eighteen days later, the trial judge had. the probation report before him. There was but little,
if anything, that counsel could have accomplished
at this stage of the proceedings. It may be observed that defendant's n~w counsel 'vho presented his v.rritten motions for a new trial and
in arrest of judgment did not make complaint
in either motion of the point now urged. Under
the circumstances, we cannot say that defendant
was denied any constitutional or statutory rights
for the mere reason that the trial judge who had
heard the cause without a jury did not appoint
new counsel to represent him upon the hearing of
23
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the motion for release on probation and the sentencing. • • •"
It is submitted that the Utah cases support the contention that in determining whether there has been a
deprivation of constitutional rights, where counsel was
absent from any stage of the proceeding, the facts and
circumstances of the incident should be examined to determine if prejudice resulted.
In State v. Stoller, 107 Utah .429, 154 P. 2d 649
(1945 ), the Utah Court had before it a claim that the
defendant was denied his constitutional rights because his
counsel was not present when written instructions were
given the jury. The court rejected the contention, apparently feeling no prejudice resulted, and no error was
committed.
In State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168, 203 P. 2d 397 (1949),
the Supreme Court indicated that additional instructions
could be given to the jury in the absence of counsel. Although the court did not decide the constitutional issue, it
was aware of it, and inferred that in the absence of
prejudice, the action would be unobjectionable.
In State v. Neal, 1 U. 2d 122, 263 P. 2d 756 (1953),
the defendant raised the very issue raised here; the
absence of counsel at the time of sentence. The court rejected the contention in the absence of prejudice, noting:
''Absence of counsel at the time of sentence: Neal
had had 12 days' notice that his sentence would be
imposed on October 16th. At that time Judge
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~~llPt t

ealled the case and Neal's. counsel "·as not
I n·est·nt: aerording- to the minute entry of the proceeding he 'vas asked if he had any reason to sho'Y
'vhy sentence ~hould not be pronounced upon him.
He answered that he had none and made no request or comment coucerning the matter of counsel. A motion for new trial had theretofore been
filed on October 9th. It was denied and sentence
"·as imposed. Under the verdict as rendered, without recommendation of leniency, the death sentence 'vas mandatory and there was nothing counsel, nor even the court, could have done except to
carry out the mandate of the statute. It would be
a useless formality to remand the case for the
purpose of having the sentence pronounced with
counsel present.' ' 3
In State v. Hines, 6 U. 2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957),
the court continued to adhere to its practice of weighing
for prejudice, for it said:
''In the absence of any showing of disadvantage to
the defendant in the procedure followed, it was no
abuse of discretion nor variance from proper procedure for the trial court to have the testimony
read to the jury without insisting that the defendant's counsel be present. (~onsequently, ",.e
find no prejudicial error as to the defendant
Hines.''
Most recently in Sta.te v. Ga·rcia, 11 U. 2d 67, 355 P.
2d 57 (1960), the Court refused to reverse a murder conviction in the absence of prejudice where the trial judge
had a conversation with a juror in the absence of counsel
and the accused.
3

Contrary to defendant's assertion the point is not one of first impression
for th"is ·Court.
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In applying the above case law to the instant situation, it appears that no ground for reversal exists.
Several continuances were granted defendant, counsel
was allowed to present his views on probation to the
Judge, a pre-sentence report was before the Court, and
it appears the Court investigated the basis which the
defendant urged for probation and rejected it. Under
these circumstances, there was little, if anything, counsel
could do, and thus no prejudice resulted to defendant.
Under these circumstances, the defendant certainly was
not prejudiced or denied a constitutional right, and the
matter does not warrant reversal. State v. Neal, supra.

CONCLUSION
The defendant's objections, when properly examined, appear unmeritorious and the defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Assistant Attorney General
.Attorneys for Respondent
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